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THE COURTS, DEVOLUTION, AND CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 
CHRISTOPHER MCCORKINDALE,* AILEEN MCHARG** AND PAUL F SCOTT*** 
I   INTRODUCTION 
 7KHGHILQLQJIHDWXUHRIWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP·V8.WUDGLWLRQDOFRQVWLWXWLRQ
is the absence of constitutional review. The UK Parliament, since it enjoys unlimited 
sovereignty, cannot be said to have acted unlawfully, and therefore its acts cannot 
be struck down by the courts. In recent years, however, this feature of the 
constitution has come under pressure from a number of different directions,1 
including the establishment of devolved legislatures for Scotland and Northern 
Ireland in 1999,2 and for Wales in 2011.3 Since these bodies do not share 
:HVWPLQVWHU·VVRYHUHLJQW\they are susceptible to judicial review on the ground that 
they have strayed beyond their legislative competence as defined in their parent 
statutes, and potentially ² in extreme circumstances ² also at common law.4 
 Judicial review of a subordinate legislature is not unprecedented in the UK 
context. Review had been possible of legislation enacted by the former Parliament 
of Northern Ireland, established under the Government of Ireland Act 1920, which 
existed from 1922 until 1972. However, resort to the courts was relatively 
uncommon ² a fact attributed inter alia to the absence of a constitutional tradition 
of legislative review5 ² and there was only one successful challenge in the 
3DUOLDPHQW·s 50-year history.6 By contrast, judicial control has proved to be a far 
more important feature of the contemporary devolution settlements, both in terms 
of their institutional design and their practical operation. For instance, provisions in 
Acts of the Scottish Parliament (ASPs) have been declared ultra vires on five 
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David Feldman (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Public Law (CUP, 2015); for a defence of the traditional 
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2 Scotland Act 1998; Northern Ireland Act 1998. 
3 The Welsh Assembly was also established in 1999, by the Government of Wales Act 1998, but only gained 
primary legislative powers in 2011 following a referendum held under the terms of the Government of Wales 
Act 2006. 
4 AXA General Insurance Ltd v Lord Advocate [2011] UKSC 46. 
5 See James Mitchell, Devolution in the UK (Manchester University Press, 2009) 74 ² 75.  
6 Ulster Transport Authority v James Brown & Sons Ltd [1953] NI 79. Calvert notes that there were other 
examples of persuasive criticisms being made of the validity of Northern Irish legislation, which on at 
least one occasion led to legislative correction ² Harry Calvert, Constitutional Law in Northern Ireland: a Study 
in Regional Government (Stevens & Sons Ltd/Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, 1968) 289.  
occasions so far,7 whilst Welsh Assembly measures have been successfully 
challenged once8 (although there have as yet been no challenges at all ² successful 
or otherwise ² to devolved primary legislation in Northern Ireland). 
 In this article, we explore the role and significance of constitutional review in 
the devolved context, focusing on the experience in Scotland. We discuss, first, the 
model of constitutional review put in place by the Scotland Act 1998; second, we 
explore the operation of these constraints in practice; and, third, we consider the 
developing devolution jurisprudence. In so doing, we identify a key tension in 
understanding the constitutional implications of the role of the courts in relation to 
the devolved legislatures. Is it, on the one hand, to be understood as a marker of the 
subordinate status of the devolved legislatures ² which therefore serves to bolster 
the constitutional status of the UK Parliament by the fact of its freedom from 
corresponding constraints? Or is LW DOWHUQDWLYHO\ D PDQLIHVWDWLRQ RI D ¶QHZ
FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP· E\ ZKLFK the Scottish Parliament has, in the words of Lord 
Rodger in Whaley v Lord Watson of Invergowrie¶MRLQHGWKDWZLGHUIDPLO\RI3DUOLDPHQWV·
ZKLFK¶owe their existence and powers to statute and are in various ways subject to 
WKHODZDQGWRWKHFRXUWVZKLFKDFWWRXSKROGWKHODZ·9; a feature which underlines 
the unusual constitutional status of the UK Parliament,10 and which may therefore 
be important a step on the road towards a more general acceptance of the legitimacy 
of constitutional review in the UK context? 
II   CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW UNDER THE SCOTLAND ACT 1998 
 The legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament is set out primarily in 
sections 28 and 29 of the Scotland Act 1998. 7KH$FW DGRSWVD ¶UHVHUYHGSRZHUV·
model of legislative competence whereby the Parliament is given plenary power to 
make laws by section 28(1), but these are subject to specific limits set out in section 
29. The most important restrictions contained in section 2911 are of two main types. 
First, there are what might be termed ¶IHGHUDO· UHVWULFWLRQV; in other words, those 
which define the division of competences between the UK and Scottish levels of 
government. Thus, the Parliament may QRWPDNHODZVZKLFK¶UHODWHWR·WKHOLVWRI
policy areas reserved to the UK Parliament set out in Schedule 5 to the Act (as 
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2017 SC (UKSC) 29; P v Scottish Ministers 2017 SLT 271; AB v HMA 2017 SLT 401. 
8 Re Recovery of Costs for Asbestos Diseases (Wales) Bill [2015] AC 1016. 
9 2000 SC 340, 349. 
10 Ibid. 
11 The Parliament is also prohibited from legislating extra-territorially (s 29)(2)(a)), or from removing the 
Lord Advocate from his position as head of the systems of criminal prosecution and investigation of 
deaths in Scotland (s 29(2)(e)). 
subsequently amended).12 In addition, it may not modify specific statutes listed in 
Schedule 4 (including some, but not all, of the provisions of the Scotland Act itself) 
nor PRGLI\WKH¶ODZRQUHVHUYHGPDWWHUV·13 (a distinct restriction from reserved policy 
areas),14 except insofar as this occurs as part of a modification of the general rules of 
Scots private or criminal law which govern reserved and devolved matters alike.15 
Secondly, there are ¶FRQVWLWXWLRQDO·UHVWULFWLRQV These are cross-cutting constraints 
applicable to legislation otherwise within devolved competence which seek to 
protect other important constitutional values, namely that ASPs must not be 
incompatible with rights contained in the European Convention on Human Rights 
¶&RQYHQWLRQULJKWV·RUIRUWKHWime being) with European Union (EU) law.16 To 
these express statutory restrictions, we must now add the further common law 
constraint that (as discussed further below) the Parliament must not legislate in a 
way which would breach the Rule of Law.17 
 As this last point suggests, one way in which these competence constraints 
may be enforced is via the ordinary supervisory jurisdiction of the courts at common 
law. But the 1998 Act itself also contains a range of mechanisms ² both political and 
judicial ² designed to ensure that the Parliament remains within competence. The 
political controls include requirements on the minister or other member introducing 
a Bill to state that its provisions are intra vires, as well as an independent requirement 
RQWKH3DUOLDPHQW·s Presiding Officer to state her opinion as to the competence of 
the Bill,18 and a veto power for UK ministers for use in situations where they 
reasonably believe that a Bill is incompatible with international obligations or the 
interests of defence or national security, or that it modifies the law on reserved 
matters in a manner which would have an adverse effect on the operation of that 
law.19 The judicial controls include a power for UK or Scottish Government law 
officers to refer a Bill to the Supreme Court for a ruling as to its competence in the 
four week period between the passing of the Bill by the Parliament and its 
submission for Royal Assent.20 In addition, Schedule 6 empowers the Law Officers 
to initiate post-enactment competence challenges, and regulates the handling of so-
FDOOHG¶GHYROXWLRQLVVXHV·ZKLFKDULVHLQRWKHUSURFHHGLQJVLQFOXGLQJSURYLVLRQIRU
notification of the law officers, and reference to higher courts. A separate procedure, 
                                                          
12 S 29(2)(b). 
13 S 29(2)(c). 
14 See Christian Institute, above n 7, at para 63. 
15 Sch 4, para 2. See Martin v HM Advocate 2010 SC (UKSC) 40; Henderson v HM Advocate 2011 JC 96. 
16 S 29(2)(d). Legislation on certain protected subject matters are now also subject to a procedural 
constraint whereby they require to be passed by a two-thirds majority ²Scotland Act 1998 s31A. 
17 AXA General Insurance Ltd, above n 4. 
18 Scotland Act 1998 s 31. 
19 Scotland Act 1998 s 35. 
20 Scotland Act 1998 ss 32A and 33. 
introduced by the Scotland Act 2012, regulates so-called ¶FRPSDWLELOLW\LVVXHV·, which 
are questions arising in criminal proceedings, inter alia, as to whether an ASP is 
compatible with Convention rights or EU law. Finally, the 1998 Act makes provision 
for interpretation of ASPs, instructing judges to read legisODWLRQ¶DVQDUURZO\DV LV
UHTXLUHG IRU LW WR EH ZLWKLQ FRPSHWHQFH LI VXFK D UHDGLQJ LV SRVVLEOH·21 and for 
remedies in the event of a finding that legislation is outwith competence.22 
 Three features of the system of constitutional review created by the Scotland 
Act are particularly noteworthy. The first is that it is, in comparative terms, a very 
expansive one. Provision is made for both pre-legislative and post-legislative challenge 
to the vires of legislation. Statutes can be attacked both directly, in proceedings raised 
specifically for that purpose, or collaterally in the course of other proceedings. In 
other words, both abstract and concrete review is permitted. In addition to the 
express provision for institutional challenge by the law officers made by the Scotland 
ActDQ\SDUW\ZLWK¶VXIILFLHQWLQWHUHVW in the subject matter of the application· can 
raise judicial review proceedings at common law,23 which is now interpreted widely 
to permit public interest as well as individual challenges.24 And there are no specific 
time limits for the raising of a devolution or compatibility issue; provided that the 
proceedings in which the issue is raised are not themselves time-barred, the vires of 
an ASP could potentially be questioned many years after the legislation was enacted. 
 Perhaps surprisingly, the extent of the judicial control over the decisions of a 
democratic legislature to which this model potentially gives rise ² the prospect, as 
one early commentator put it, for the creation of ¶XQ JRXYHUQHPHQW GHV MXJHV·25 with 
extensive freedom to interpret necessarily broad constitutional limits on the powers 
of the Scottish Parliament ² was not controversial at the time the Scotland Act was 
enacted. This contrasts starkly with attitudes during earlier, abortive attempts at 
creating devolved assemblies for Scotland and Wales during the 1970s.  As Tam 
Dalyell MP explained during the Commons Second Reading debate on the Scotland 
Bill:26  
Who is to decide whether the Scottish Assembly has overstepped its powers? During the 1974-77 
saga, that was a matter of hot debate within the Government, centring around the issue of judicial 
review. One school held, virtually as a matter of basic legal and constitutional principle, that it 
would be wrong to deny citizens the right to argue in the courts that an assembly Act that 
disadvantaged them exceeded the powers granted by Westminster in the devolution statute. The 
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22 Scotland Act 1998 s 103. 
23 Court of Session Act 1988 s 27B(2)(a). 
24 AXA General Insurance Ltd, above n 4; Walton v Scottish Ministers [2012] UKSC 44. 
25 $LGDQ2·1HLOO¶7KH6FRWODQG$FWDQGWKH*RYHUQPHQWRI-XGJHV·6/71HZV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26 HC Deb Vol 304, col 88, 12 January 1998. 
other school held « that it would be unreasonable in practice, for lack-of-certainty reasons, and 
politically objectionable to Scotland that the primary legislation of the Assembly should be liable 
at any time--perhaps, long after enactment--to be struck down by the courts as ultra vires. The 
more broadly drawn the delineation, the greater--so that school argued--the risks. 
 Mitchell cites the minute of a meeting in October 1974 of Whitehall 
Permanent Secretaries convened to discuss the issue of devolution. The participants 
¶QRWHG that little thought had been given to resolving constitutional disputes but 
rejected a ´FRQVWLWXWLRQDO tribunal such as the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
&RXQFLOµ as ´HQWLUHO\ contrary to the spirit of devolution within a unitary state with 
one sovereign 3DUOLDPHQWµ This, they maintained, ´VKRXOG not be FRQWHPSODWHGµ·27 
 What had changed by 1998? Dalyell points to the impact of EU law as having 
meant that ¶SXEOLF opinion has become more accustomed to the idea that the legal 
system might indeed be able to overrule democratically enacted VWDWXWH·28 But also 
significant is the origins of the 1998 Act in the work of the Scottish Constitutional 
Convention.29 This body had begun life by endorsing the 1988 Claim of Right for 
Scotland, which proclaimed the sovereignty of the Scottish people over the 
sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament, and asserted the need for a system of 
checks and balances rather than concentration of power. Thus the Convention 
rooted its proposals for a Scottish Parliament in a claimed ¶KLVWRULFDO and historic 
Scottish constitutional principle that power is limited, should be dispersed and is 
derived from the SHRSOH·30 By the time the Scotland Bill was enacted, therefore, the 
principle that disputes over legislative competence should be subject to judicial 
resolution was no longer controversial.31 As will be discussed further below, the only 
issue subject to serious debate was the identity of the court to which final appeal on 
devolution issues would lie.   
 The second important feature of constitutional review in the devolution 
context is its asymmetry. The hard legal limits on the competence of the Scottish 
Parliament are not mirrored by equivalent limits on the UK Parliament. As far as the 
federal constraints are concerned, the power of the UK Parliament to legislate for 
Scotland in devolved matters is expressly preserved by section 28(7) of the Scotland 
Act 1998. Its exercise is subject only to political constraint in the form of the so-
called Sewel Convention, which states that the UK Parliament will not normally 
                                                          
27 Mitchell, above n 5, 120 ² 121. 
28 Above n 26. 
29 6HH-HDQ0F)DGGHQ¶7KH6FRWWLVK&RQVWLWXWLRQDO&RQYHQWLRQ·>@3/ 
30 Scottish Constitutional Convention, 6FRWODQG·V3DUOLDPHQW6FRWODQG·V5LJKW (1995) 10. 
31 The case for judicial resolution had been set out in detail prior to the 1997 election by Colin Boyd QC, 
ZKRVXEVHTXHQWO\EHFDPH6ROLFLWRU*HQHUDOIRU6FRWODQG¶3DUOLDPHQWVDQG&RXUWV3RZHUVDQG'LVSXWH
5HVROXWLRQ·LQ6W-RKQ%DWHVHGDevolution to Scotland: the Legal Aspects (T & T Clark, 1997). 
legislate in respect of devolved matters without the consent of the Scottish 
Parliament. Notwithstanding the statutory ¶UHFRJQLWLRQ· of the convention by section 
2 of the Scotland Act 2016, the Supreme Court in R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting 
the European Union32 held that it remains a convention rather than a binding legal rule, 
and that the courts therefore have no role to play in either interpreting or enforcing 
its requirements.33 
 As regards the constitutional constraints, Convention rights bear more heavily 
on the Scottish Parliament than on the UK Parliament. Whereas an ASP which is 
incompatible with Convention rights is ¶QRW ODZ· in relation to UK statutes the 
courts are merely empowered to issue a ¶GHFODUDWLRQ of LQFRPSDWLELOLW\· which does 
not invalidate the legislation.34 Only the EU law constraint operates more or less 
symmetrically, insofar as the courts may ¶GLVDSSO\· an Act of the UK Parliament 
which is contrary to EU law,35 though even here there is a theoretical difference since 
there is judicial authority stating that the courts would give effect to an Act of the 
UK Parliament which expressly contradicted EU law.36 More significantly, if the 
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill is enacted in its current form, the devolved 
legislatures will continue to be bound by ¶UHWDLQHG EU ODZ· even after the UK leaves 
the EU, while the UK Parliament will become free to amend it as it pleases. 
 From one perspective, this asymmetry is unremarkable; it merely marks the 
important constitutional distinction between a scheme of devolution and one of 
federalism, thereby underlining the subordinate status of the devolved legislatures. 
However, the justification for asymmetry is less obvious in relation to the cross-
cutting constraints, especially Convention rights.  Here the case can be made in 
principle that it is the democratic nature of a legislative body that entitles it, rather 
than the courts, to the last word on questions of rights protection within its sphere 
of competence, and not merely the ¶WHFKQLFDOLW\· of parliamentary sovereignty which 
uniquely entitles the Westminster Parliament to judicial deference.37 The anomaly is 
underlined by the fact that the Scottish Ministers are also more tightly bound by 
Convention rights than their UK counterparts in that they cannot act incompatibly 
with Convention rights even if acting under a UK statute which authorises the 
                                                          
32 [2017] UKSC 5. 
33 This does not mean that it might not be given some legal force, for instance as an aid to interpreting 
the intention of Parliament in circumstances where it is unclear whether or not it intends to legislate for 
Scotland on a devolved matter. 
34 Human Rights Act 1998 s 4. 
35 R v Secretary of State for Transport ex p Factortame Ltd (No 2) [1991] 1 AC 603. 
36 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2003] QB 151.  
37 6HH&KULV+LPVZRUWK¶5LJKWVYHUVXV'HYROXWLRQ·LQ7RP&DPSEHOO.'(ZLQJDQG$GDP7RPNLQV
(eds), Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (OUP, 2001). 
incompatibility.38 In relation to EU law, similarly, it may be argued that the refusal 
to lift the competence constraint on the devolved institutions post-Brexit evinces a 
lack of trust and a pulling of constitutional rank by Westminster, which is difficult 
to justify as a matter of constitutional principle.   
 The final notable feature of the devolution model of constitutional review is 
the role of the UK Supreme Court as the final arbiter of devolution issues. As originally 
enacted, the final appeal court for devolution disputes was the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council (JCPC). The JCPC was chosen for a number of reasons: it had 
played this role under the Government of Ireland Act 1920; it had experience of 
constitutional adjudication in relation to Commonwealth jurisdictions; and above all 
it avoided the perception ² had the House of Lords been chosen as the apex court 
² of the UK Parliament sitting in judgment on disputes to which it was a party. 
Nevertheless, amendments were tabled both by the Scottish National Party (SNP) 
in the House of Commons39 and by the Liberal Democrats in the House of Lords,40 
to replace the JCPC with a specially-constituted constitutional court. For the SNP, 
the main objection was to the composition of the JCPC, particularly its dominance 
by English-trained judges. For the Liberal Democrats, the primary concern was the 
-&3&·V lack of institutional independence.   
 The latter issue was resolved in 2009, with the establishment of the Supreme 
Court41 and the transfer to it of the -&3&·V devolution jurisdiction (a reform which 
also resolved the practical problem created by the existence of two ¶DSH[ FRXUWV· 
which were sometimes asked to resolve the same legal issues by different procedural 
routes). However, the creation of the Supreme Court revived the 613·V objection 
to an English-dominated court having the last word on matters relating to Scots law. 
In fact, it commissioned a review of the possibilities for ¶UHSDWULDWLQJ· final appeals 
in Scots cases to an Edinburgh-based court, although the resulting report concluded 
that this would be constitutionally inappropriate while Scotland remained part of the 
United Kingdom.42 Of particular sensitivity, though, was the question of final 
appeals in criminal cases. The Scotland Act 1998 had inadvertently created a right of 
appeal in criminal cases from the High Court of Justiciary to the JCPC/Supreme 
Court, where none had previously existed, because of the inclusion of the Lord 
Advocate (head of the Scottish criminal prosecution system) within the definition of 
the Scottish Ministers, and hence the subjection of prosecution decisions to 
                                                          
38 Scotland Act 1998 s 57(2). 
39 See HC Deb Vol 312, cols 203 - 215, 12 May 1998.  
40 See HL Deb Vol 593, cols 1963 ² 1986, 18 October 1998. 
41 Under the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 Pt 3. 
42 Neil Walker, Final Appellate Jurisdiction in the Scottish Legal System (Scottish Government, 2010) 
<http://www.gov.scot/Resource/Doc/299388/0093334.pdf>. 
devolution constraints. Following controversy about the operation of this appeal 
process amongst Scottish judges, and well-publicised objections by the then Scottish 
First Minister and Justice Secretary to the Supreme &RXUW·V decisions in Cadder v HM 
Advocate43 and Fraser v HM Advocate,44 the separate compatibility issues procedure was 
created for criminal cases, which limits the role of the Supreme Court to the 
determination of the compatibility issues and requires the case to be referred back 
to the High Court of Justiciary (HCJ) for final disposal.45 
 In determining devolution or compatibility issues, the Supreme Court is ² 
uniquely ² sitting as a UK court, rather than a Scottish (or English and Welsh, or 
Northern Irish) one as it does in all other cases.46 In other words, determination of 
the limits of the Scottish 3DUOLDPHQW·V legislative competence is conceived of as a 
matter of UK constitutional law, rather than a matter of Scots law. Again, from one 
perspective, it is unremarkable that the establishment of institutions for self-rule 
through devolution should be balanced by the creation of a mechanism for asserting 
a common understanding of the limits to that self-rule. Nevertheless, the role of the 
Supreme Court remains contestable for two reasons. One is that differently-situated 
judges might have different understandings of the nature of the evolving 
constitutional order and of the place of the Scottish Parliament within it ² something 
that is potentially problematic given the political understanding of the origins of 
devolution as an expression of a peculiarly Scottish constitutional tradition at odds 
with the dominant UK tradition. Secondly, as will be discussed further below, the 
idea of a common devolution jurisdiction is problematic given the diversity of the 
devolution settlements in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland themselves. And 
even in the application of the common external constraints of Convention rights 
and EU law, there is room for greater recognition of internal diversity that the 
unifying role of the Supreme Court may permit.47 
III   JUDICIAL AND PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 
A   Judicial Constitutional Review 
                                                          
43 [2010] UKSC 43. 
44 [2011] UKSC 24. 
45 6HH$LOHHQ0F+DUJ¶)LQDO$SSHDOVLQ6FRWV&ULPLQDO&DVHV·8.&RQVW/DZ%ORJ2FWREHU
&KULV+LPVZRUWKDQG&KULVWLQH2·1HLOO6FRWODQG·V&RQVWLWXWLRQ/DZDQG3UDFWLFH (Bloomsbury, 3rd edn, 2015) 
para 14.20. 
46 Constitutional Reform Act 2005 s 41(2). 
47 6HH'DYLG)HOGPDQ¶1RQH2QHRU6HYHUDO3HUVSHFWLYHVRQWKH8.·V&RQVWLWXWLRQV·&/-
329. 
 At the outset of the devolution project there was a certain expectation that 
the courts would regularly be called upon, whether by UK and/or Scottish 
Government Law Officers referring Bills to the Supreme Court during the statutory 
pre-enactment period48 or in post-enactment challenges raised by private parties, to 
exercise their new powers of constitutional review. Whilst for some this was an 
aspiration ² WREHDPRGHOIRUGHPRFUDF\DFFRUGLQJWR&ULFNDQG0LOODU ¶>DQHZ@
6FRWWLVK 3DUOLDPHQW«QHHGV >WR EH OLPLWHGE\ ODZ@ DV PXFK DV DQ\ RWKHU·49 ² for 
others the possibility was PRUHSUREOHPDWLF$V$LGDQ2·1HLOOKDGZDUQHGE\EHLQJ
¶GUDJJHG LQWR WKHSROLWLFDO DUHQD· LQ RUGHU WR SROLFH FRQVWLWXWLRQDO ERXQGDULHV WKH
integrity of the judges themselves was at stake: the danger being that their decisions 
would not EHSRUWUD\HGDV¶XSKROGLQJLQGLYLGXDOULJKWVEXWDVWKHWKZDUWLQJRIWKH
GHPRFUDWLFZLOO· DV H[SUHVVHG WKURXJK WKHDFWVRIQHZ OHJLVODWXUHDQGH[HFXWLYH50 
However, the experience to date has been quite different.  
 Contrary to the expectation that the Scottish Parliament would be of a 
GLIIHUHQW QDWXUH WR :HVWPLQVWHU·V ¶OHJLVODWLYH VDXVDJH IDFWRU\·51 the devolved 
Parliament has been something of a hyper-active legislature, having passed 264 ASPs 
(an average of 15 per annum) since its first - the Mental Health (Public Safety and 
Appeals) (Scotland) Act - in 1999.52 Notwithstanding the volume of legislation, 
however, no Bills have been referred by the Law Officers to the Supreme Court53 
and there have been relatively few post-enactment challenges raised by private 
parties. Of the latter, just 18 ASPs have been subject to judicial review (albeit some 
more than once).54 Incompatibility with Convention rights has been the dominant 
ground of challenge, with just three cases invoking the reserved/devolved boundary 
and three arguing for an incompatibility with EU law. Of the 18 ASPs that have been 
challenged five have been held to have fallen foul of section 29. All five have 
succeeded on Convention rights grounds, albeit in Christian Institute there was a 
parallel incompatibility as between article 8 ECHR and equivalent provisions of the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.55 The residual Rule of Law ground set out in 
                                                          
48 Scotland Act 1998 s 33. 
49 Bernard Crick and David Millar, To Make the Parliament of Scotland a Model for Democracy (John Wheatley 
Centre, 1995) 9. 
50 Above n 25, 66.  
51 Alan Page, Constitutional Law of Scotland (W Green, 2015) 201. 
52 This Act was itself the subject of an unsuccessful challenge in Anderson v Scottish Ministers 2002 SC (PC) 
63. 
53 By way of contrast, in Wales two Bills have been referred to the Supreme Court by the Attorney 
General (the legality of each being upheld) and one, which was struck down, has been referred by the 
Counsel General for Wales. 
54 The Tobacco and Primary Medical Services (Scotland) Act 2010 was challenged separately on reserved matters 
grounds by Imperial Tobacco ([2012] UKSC 61]) and on EU law grounds by a subsidiary, Sinclair Collis 
([2012] CSIH 80). 
55 Christian Institute, above n 7, paras 102-105. 
AXA has not been a significant feature of devolution litigation, receiving sustained 
attention only once, in an unsuccessful challenge to the exclusion of prisoners from 
the right to vote in the Scottish Independence Referendum (Franchise) Act 2013.56 Given 
the high threshold for judicial intervention on this ground, this is unsurprising. In 
this case, however, the Supreme Court did illustrate the sort of (unlikely) situation 
to which this ground might apply: whilst the common law could not be used to 
extend the franchise beyond the limits set by the legislature, the Supreme Court ² 
¶LQIRUPHGE\SULQFLSOHVRIGHPRFUDF\DQGWKHUXOHRIODZDQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOQRUPV·² 
would GHFODUH OHJLVODWLRQ WREHXQODZIXOZKLFKVRXJKW WR ¶HQWUHQFK >WKHH[HFXWLYH@
SRZHUE\FXUWDLOPHQWRIWKHIUDQFKLVHRUVLPLODUGHYLFH·57      
 Of the five cases to date in which legislation has been held ¶QRW [to be] ODZ·LW
is notable that each has related to specific provisions within the statutory scheme 
rather than to the statute or to the overall policy objective in its entirety. This being 
so WKH6XSUHPH&RXUWKDVVRIDUDGRSWHGVRPHWKLQJRID¶GLDORJLF·UHPHGLDODSSURDFK
as opposed to a rigid and final strike down. In two of the three civil challenges that 
were successful ² Salvesen and Christian Institute ² the Supreme Court exercised its 
discretion under section 102(2)(b) of the Scotland Act 1998 to suspend the effect of 
its decisions that section 72(10) of the Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 2003 and the 
information sharing provisions of Part 4 of the Children and Young People (Scotland) Act 
2004 respectively were incompatible with Convention rights. This, the Court said, 
would allow an opportunity for the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Ministers 
(if they so decide) to take measures in order to remedy the identified 
incompatibilities.58 The dialogic nature of this remedy was underlined in Christian 
Institute LQ ZKLFK DOWKRXJK WKH &RXUW IHOW LW ¶LQDSSURSULDWH WR SURSRVH SDUWLFXODU
OHJLVODWLYHVROXWLRQV·59 it nevertheless took the opportunity to warn the executive and 
legislature that minimal amendments that failed to address the complexity of the 
breach would run the risk of further judicial sanction.60 The third, P v Scottish 
Ministers, was a decision by the Outer House which at the time of writing had been 
put out to order pending sXEPLVVLRQVRQWKHXVHRIWKHFRXUW·VUHPHGLDOSRZHUV61 
In the remaining two successful cases - Cameron and AB, each of which raised 
¶FRPSDWLELOLW\LVVXHV·UHODWLQJWRFULPLQDOSURFHGXUHLQ6FRWODQG² the decisions that 
section 58 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 and section 39(2)(a)(i) 
of the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 UHVSHFWLYHO\ZHUH¶QRWODZ·ZHUHUHWXUQHGWR
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59 Christian Institute, above n 7, para 107. 
60 Ibid. 
61 P, above n 7, para 65. 
the HCJ for that court to determine whether or not to suspend or to vary the effects 
of the resulting invalidity.  
 In Martin, Lord Hope expressed a degree of surprise that ² in light of the 
complex and multi-layered boundaries to legislative competence ² there had been so 
IHZFKDOOHQJHVWRWKHYDOLGLW\RI$63VDQGQRWHGDV¶UHPDUNDEOH·WKHIDFWWKDWWKRVH
challenges had mostly been confined to Convention rights grounds.62 Though the 
reserved matters model adopted in the Scotland Act 1998 PLJKWQRWEH¶DPRGHORI
FODULW\·he thought it striking that it had so far achieved the aim of maximum stability. 
To this stability Lord Hope attributed harmony between the UK (Labour majority) 
and Scottish (Labour-led coalition) governments until the SNP formed a minority 
government in May 2007.63 However, it is a significant feature of the SNP minority 
(2007-2011 and 2016-present) and majority (2011-2016) governments that political 
disharmony as between the Scottish and UK Governments since 2007 has not 
manifested in overt attempts by the former unilaterally to push the limits of devolved 
competence and to make political capital out of even adverse judgments about 
competence by the UK Supreme Court. Instead the close attention that is paid to 
the reserved/devolved boundary during the process of parliamentary review ² in 
particular in the dialogue between the UK and Scottish Governments that precedes 
WKH$GYRFDWH*HQHUDO·VGHFLVLRQWRPDNHDUHIHUHQFHWRWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW- as well 
DV SROLWLFLDQV· DQG RIILFLDOV· LQVWLQFWV IRU ZKDW VLWV ZLWKLQ WKH VSKHUH RI GHYROYHG
competence and a genuinely-held commitment on both sides to government 
according to the rule of law - seems to have policed the reserved/devolved boundary 
effectively (at least in the sense of producing legislation that has so far avoided 
judicial censure).64 To the reasons for the surprisingly few cases raised on reserved 
matters grounds we might add the willingness on both sides to utilise the flexibility 
inherent in the devolution settlement to supply omissions in legislative competence 
where there is a degree of policy convergence through the transfer of competence65 
or by the UK Parliament legislating with devolved consent in reserved areas that 
overlap with Scottish Government policy. We might attribute the greater frequency 
of - and the more successful recourse to - Convention rights grounds to the 
simultaneously more obvious and yet more vague nature of the ECHR boundary. 
On the one hand Convention rights issues are more readily identifiable ² both by 
lawyers and by those who are potentially affected by legislative or executive action - 
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64 )RUPRUHGHWDLOHGDQDO\VLVRIWKHYHWWLQJSURFHVVVHH%UXFH$GDPVRQ¶The Protection of Human 
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65 This might happen by Order-in-Council under section 33 of the Scotland Act 1998 or by way of primary 
legislation by the UK Parliament. 
than are issues arising from the nuances of schedules 4 and 5, with a vast body of 
ECHR grounded case law (both at Strasbourg and in the domestic courts) to draw 
upon. On the other hand, it may be more difficult for legislators and officials 
correctly to anticipate how courts might apply abstract Convention rights to 
particular statutory provisions in the absence of directly analogous cases. 
 If the fear was that the judiciary would regularly be called upon to (and would 
often) exercise strong powers of judicial review in relation to ASPs, this has not yet 
materialised. Indeed, Page has argued that it is not judicial activism but judicial 
inactivity WKDWKDVGHILQHGWKHH[SHULHQFHVRIDUWKDW¶FRQVFLRXVRIWKHPRUHH[SRVHG
position in which they finGWKHPVHOYHVDVDUHVXOWRIGHYROXWLRQ·WKHMXGLFLDU\KDYH
been ² and might continue to be - ZDU\ RI ZLHOGLQJ WKRVH SRZHUV ZLWK ¶EOHDN·
consequences for the aspiration of a legislature and government limited by law.66 
However, even if its use (for better or for worse) has been infrequent there is no 
doubt that the presence of what has been described by Lord Neuberger to be in 
effect a constitutional court in the devolved context67 - to which the final word as to 
the legality of legislation has been vested - has significantly impacted upon the 
devolution landscape.  
 First, there is an opportunity for those with significant commercial interests 
at stake - and deep resources to draw upon - to (ab)use the legal process in order to 
delay for three to five years the implementation of legislation for short term, private 
gain. Even if ultimately their challenges were unsuccessful in the Supreme Court, the 
opportunity for AXA General Insurance to delay the implementation of legislation 
requiring them to make payments to the victims of asbestos exposure (with the hope 
of having to make fewer payments to still surviving victims at a later date of 
implementation), or the opportunity for Imperial Tobacco68 or the Scotch Whisky 
Association69 to delay the implementation of legislation with a likely negative impact 
upon the sale of tobacco or alcohol products (weighing income from sales during 
the period of the challenge against the cost of legal fees), illustrates the way in which 
judicially-enforceable limits on legislatures can be used strategically to subvert 
democratic institutions even where the judicial power to strike down legislation is 
wielded only sparingly. It is, in other words, the existence as well as the exercise of 
judicial power that proves problematic. Second, whilst remedial discretion in the 
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68 Imperial Tobacco v Lord Advocate [2012] UKSC 61. 
69 Scotch Whisky Association v Lord Advocate [2016] CSIH 77. At the time of writing the Supreme Court has 
heard arguments on the final appeal but has not yet handed down its decision in a case primarily 
concerned with competence on the EU law ground. 
event of a successful challenge returns the issue to be resolved by the democratically 
elected parliament or government, the courts wield a significant power therein 
actively to shape that resolution (as in Christian Institute by making a bold assertion 
of what would not be acceptable). Moreover, for those affected by ultra vires 
legislation a decision, for example, to limit the retrospective effect of the judgment 
(as in Cameron ZKHUHWKHHIIHFWRIWKHGHFLVLRQZDVOLPLWHGRQO\WR¶OLYH·FDVHVPD\
have perverse effects for individuals who have in the past suffered from a resulting 
harm.70 Third, the devolution jurisprudence (actual or anticipated) of the Supreme 
Court drives the assessments of legislative competence that are made at the sections 
31 and 33 checkpoints during the parliamentary process of constitutional review, 
washing judicial norms through the political process.         
B   Parliamentary Constitutional Review 
 In recent years public law scholarship has sought to describe, and to defend, 
DQDOWHUQDWLYHRU¶WKLUGZD\·RIFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP7KLVDSSURDFKEXLOGVXSRQUDWKHU
than breaks with) antecedent models of legislative or judicial supremacy in which 
either the parliament or the courts have the last word on the legality of legislation.71 
Two characteristics distinguish this approach. One is constrained judicial remedial 
powers. For Westminster-based parliamentary systems, the idea of introducing a 
judicially-enforceable bill of rights represents a fundamental departure from 
previously held assumptions about the core constitutional principle of parliamentary 
supremacy. However, by distinguishing between judicial review and judicial remedies, it 
is possible to retain the OHJLVODWXUH·V ODVW ZRUG RQ WKH YDOLGLW\ RI OHJLVODWLRQ 7KH
second fundamental characteristic is that this approach envisages a far more 
important role for rights review at the legislative stage than is usually associated with 
a bill of rights. By placing a statutory obligation on the executive to report to 
parliament when a Bill is inconsistent with rights this particular focus reflects the 
following ideals:72 first, identifying whether and how proposed legislation implicates 
rights; second, encouraging more rights-compliant ways of achieving legislative 
objectives (and in the extreme discourage the pursuit of objectives that are 
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).OXJ9DOXHVIRUD*RGOHVV$JH7KH6WRU\RIWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP·V
New Bill of Rights (Penguin, 2000). 
72 These reporting obligations vary. Some are made by the Attorney General (New Zealand, ACT) or 
Justice Minister (Canada), whereas others are made by the sponsoring minister (UK and Victoria); some 
include only government Bills (Canada, UK); and some require reports only for inconsistency (Canada, 
New Zealand) whereas others report both affirmative and negative reports of compatibility (UK, ACT 
and Victoria). 
fundamentally incompatible with rights); third, facilitating parliamentary deliberation 
about whether legislation implicates righWVWKHUHE\LQFUHDVLQJSDUOLDPHQW·VFDSDFLW\
to pressure government to justify, alter or abandon legislation that unduly infringes 
rights.73  
 :KLOVWWKH6FRWODQG$FWPRGHOGHSDUWVIURPWKLV¶WKLUGZD\·E\UHVHUYLQJWR
the judiciary the last word on the legality of ASPs, the statutory reporting 
requirement set out in sections 31 and 33 expand the traditional scope of 
parliamentary review in two ways. First, by requiring not only the responsible person 
W\SLFDOO\ WKH UHVSRQVLEOH 0LQLVWHU EXW LQ DGGLWLRQ WKH 3DUOLDPHQW·V 3UHVLGLQJ
Officer to report to the legislature on the question of competence, and by permitting 
the Scottish and UK Government Law Officers to refer a Bill directly to the Supreme 
Court where concerns persist, the Scotland Act requires a far more expansive range 
of assessments of competence that combine so as to create stronger incentives than 
exist in other jurisdictions for the executive to revisit opinions of competence or to 
make amendments in order to secure a safe passage for its legislation. Second, the 
devolution model expands the range of constitutional boundaries against which 
these assessments must be made. Not just rights review, the Scotland Act requires 
parliamentary constitutional review in a broader sense, taking account of the territorial 
division of power between the UK and the devolved institutions as well as the rights 
and obligations that flow from membership of the European Union. Taken together, 
the aims of this form of review are two-fold. Internally, it serves to ensure that at 
each of the relevant check-points a proper and informed assessment has been made 
about competence.74 It should, in other words, be extremely difficult for the Scottish 
Government (knowingly or otherwise) to introduce, and for the Scottish Parliament 
to pass, legislation that is outwith competence. Externally, it serves to aid the 
Scottish Parliament in the exercise of its scrutiny function by informing Parliament 
so that ² as the Bill makes its way through the chamber - LWVPHPEHUVPD\ ¶DVN
questions about [those assessments], raise queries as to whether [they are] entirely 
correct, and no doubt identify particular provisions in the Bill where there may or 
may not be some doubt as to whether the provisions lie within the legislative 
FRPSHWHQFH·75 Constitutional review, in other words, ought in the first instance to 
be a political exercise conducted during the legislative process and in relation to all 
Bills rather than a judicial examination of the relatively few pieces of legislation that 
are brought to the attention of the senior courts. 
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 The experience of judicial review outlined above points to the relative 
effectiveness of these checks in achieving the first aim: the protection of legislation 
against judicial censure. However, the second aspiration ² informing the legislature 
so that it might be aware of and engage with competence concerns during the 
legislative process ² has not yet been met. Despite there being serious disagreement 
between the Scottish Government and the Presiding Officer and/or Law Officers 
as to the legislative competence of a Bill once or twice in a typical year76 there have 
been no instances of the Presiding Officer disclosing the existence or the nature of 
any disagreement to the Parliament upon introduction, and disagreement between 
the Scottish and UK Government has not yet manifested in the reference of a Bill 
by the Advocate General to the Supreme Court during the four week pre-enactment 
period.77 Instead these disagreements are resolved in a series of iterative processes 
that take place mostly between officials during the policy formulation stage (between 
the Scottish Government Legal Directorate (SGLD) and the Lord Advocate) and in 
the pre-introduction period (between the Scottish Government and (separately) both 
the Solicitor to the Scottish Parliament, on behalf of the Presiding Officer, and the 
Office of the Advocate General (OAG) on behalf of the UK Government). During 
these processes the key question IRUHDFKRIWKHUHOHYDQWDFWRUVLV ¶KRZZRXOGWKH
6XSUHPH &RXUW EH OLNHO\ WR GHFLGH· LQ WKH HYHQW RI D judicial challenge. For the 
Scottish Government, the key decision is whether to amend legislation before it is 
introduced into the Parliament in order to address concerns expressed by the Lord 
Advocate, the Presiding Officer or by OAG that the Supreme Court would be likely 
to strike down the legislation (or provisions therein) in its existing form, or whether 
to continue with its view that the legislation is likely to be saved by the Court. In the 
case of close calls the benefit of the doubt will normally be given to the Scottish 
*RYHUQPHQW·V YLHZ ZKHUH LW LV UHDVRQDEO\ DUJXDEOH WKDW OHJLVODWLRQ RU SRZHUV
conferred therein) would be more likely than not to survive judicial censure.78    
 A holistic analysis of these processes is beyond the scope of this article.79 For 
present purposes we need only stress two important ways in which the possibility of 
judicial constitutional review influences this process. First, because the ultimate 
sanction is judicial strike down the question of competence is seen as a legal question 
that is best addressed by legal advisors reflecting upon the jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court, rather than by political actors. On the question of competence 
Ministers will defer entirely to the view of the Lord Advocate whilst the Presiding 
Officer ² a Member of the Scottish Parliament (MSP) typically with no legal 
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background - will lean heavily on the advice offered by the Solicitor to the Scottish 
Parliament. Moreover, MSPs in plenary or in committee will defer to the view of the 
Presiding Officer that a Bill is within competence rather than look behind that 
statement to determine whether there persists a reasonable (but undisclosed) doubt 
that should be examined further during the legislative process. The legal nature of 
the exercise in other words undermines the aim of informed parliamentary review 
behind the SURFHVV·V ¶HIILFLHQW VHFUHW·: the more impactful exercise of bureaucratic 
review by officials before the Bill is introduced into Parliament. Second, because the 
test is conceived of in legal terms the aspiration to think politically about legislative 
competence risks giving way to an assessment of the bare minimum protection 
required by law. So, the exclusion of prisoners from the franchise in the 2014 
independence referendum seemed to proceed not from a principled position on the 
merits or not of allowing (to some) prisoners the right to vote in a referendum of 
such constitutional significance but instead to a narrow reading of the scope of the 
right to vote.80  
IV    DEVOLUTION JURISPRUDENCE    
 This third section draws out certain of the themes of the case law in which 
the devolution settlement has been considered. It works outwards from the question 
which most neatly captures the tension, already identified, between two 
understandings of the judicial role within that settlement: on one hand, the notion 
that the courts' role thereunder is a marker of the subordinate status of the devolved 
institutions and, on the other, the claim that their new functions have in fact an 
inescapably constitutional essence, with implications beyond the devolution context. 
That question is the status of the devolution statutes, and - in turn - the approach 
that is to be taken to their interpretation. 
A   Review of the Scotland Act 1998 
 With regard to the interpretation of the devolution statutes themselves we 
might usefully distinguish between two levels of judicial power: the first order power 
of interpretation and the second-order power to choose which approach is to be 
taken to the task. In the early case law the status of the Parliament was contested. 
Lord Rodger, then in the Inner House, noted in Whaley that the court at first instance 
had JLYHQ¶LQVXIILFLHQWZHLJKWWRWKHIXQGDPHQWDOFKDUDFWHURIWKH3DUOLDPHQWDVD
body which ³ however important its role ³ has been created by statute and derives 
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LWV SRZHUV IURP VWDWXWH· DQGZKLFK PXVW WKHUHIRUH DQG ¶OLNH DQ\ RWKHU VWDWXWRU\
ERG\· ¶ZRUN ZLWKLQ WKH VFRSHRI WKRVH SRZHUV·81 However, the question of the 
status of the Parliament does not itself determine the status (and correct approach 
to the interpretation) of the instrument which created it, and these questions 
persisted even after the status of the devolved legislature was settled, prompted most 
clearly by attempts to employ certain dicta of the House of Lords in the Northern 
Irish case of Robinson in order to argue that the devolution statutes (as the House of 
Lords had said of the Northern Ireland Act 1998) were ¶LQHIIHFW·FRQVWLWXWLRQVDQGVR
ZHUHWREHLQWHUSUHWHG¶JHQHURXVO\DQGSXUSRVLYHO\·82  
 The alleged implication of these remarks ² that an approach be taken to 
interpretation that was special to the devolution statutes and which would in effect 
give the benefit of the doubt to the Parliament in deciding whether or not ASPs were 
within competence ² was consistently rejected in later cases. In Imperial Tobacco, Lord 
+RSHVWDWHGWKDW ¶WKHGHVFULSWLRQRI WKH$FWDVDFRQVWLWXWLonal statute cannot be 
WDNHQLQLWVHOIWREHDJXLGHWRLWVLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ·83 instead, the rules in the 1998 Act 
¶PXVWEH LQWHUSUHWHG LQ WKH VDPHZD\ DV DQ\RWKHU UXOHV WKDW DUH IRXQG LQ D8.
VWDWXWH·7KRXJKWKHV\VWHPLWFUHDWHGPXVW¶EHWDNHQWRKDYHbeen intended to create 
a system for the exercise of legislative power by the Scottish Parliament that was 
FRKHUHQWVWDEOHDQGZRUNDEOH·WKDWIDFWRUZDVQRWXQLTXHWRLWEXWZDVFRPPRQWR
all statutes.84 ¶7KHEHVWZD\RIHQVXULQJWKDWDFRKHUHQWVWDEOHand workable outcome 
LVDFKLHYHG·/RUG+RSHFRQWLQXHG ¶LVWRDGRSWDQDSSURDFKWRWKHPHDQLQJRID
VWDWXWHWKDWLVFRQVWDQWDQGSUHGLFWDEOH·DQHQGDFKLHYHGE\FRQVWLWXWLQJWKHVWDWXWH
¶DFFRUGLQJWRWKHRUGLQDU\PHDQLQJRIWKHZRUGVXVHG·85 The approach ultimately 
taken therefore amounts in the first place to a multiple renunciation of judicial 
power: first, the power to depart from the ordinary meaning of words; second, the 
power to infer the purpose of the devolution statutes and to use it to place on the 
language therein a construction which the ordinary meaning of the words may not 
be capable of bearing. It remains the case, however, that this renunciation of a first 
order judicial power is itself an exercise of the second order power identified above, 
where ² albeit within important limits ² judges can and do decide what they get to 
decide. The courts have been willing to acknowledge the constitutional status of the 
Scotland Acts when little or nothing is at stake in doing so, but have been mostly 
unwilling to accept that the fact of devolution effected any constitutional change 
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beyond what is immediately apparent from the terms of those statutes and their 
counterparts elsewhere. 
 One partial exception to this approach is the decision of the Supreme Court 
in H v Lord Advocate,86 in which Lord Hope held (applying Lord Justice Laws· obiter 
dictum in Thoburn)87 that the Scotland Act, as a constitutional statute, could not be 
impliedly repealed. The issue here was whether the Extradition Act 2003, which 
excluded an appeal from the High Court of Justiciary to the Supreme Court in 
relation to a decision under that Act, overrode the provisions in Schedule 6 of the 
Scotland Act for dealing with devolution issues. The court held that they did not. 
$KPHG DQG3HUU\ DUJXH WKDW/RUG+RSH·V UXOLQJ DERXW WKH LQDELOLW\ WR LPSOLHGO\
repeal the Scotland Act was itself merely obiter,88 since he ultimately found no 
inconsistency between the two statutes.  However, his reasoning is ambiguous, and 
complicated by the fact that he noted a general presumption of statutory 
interpretation against implied repeal which, he argued ¶LVHYHQVWURQJHUWKHPRUH
weighty the enactment that is said to have been impliedly UHSHDOHG·89 Though this 
was ultimately, therefore, a case in which the constitutional status of the Scotland 
Act was relevant to the resolution of the issues before the court, it is striking that no 
attempt was made to link the TXHVWLRQRIWKH6FRWODQG$FW·VVWDWXVLQThoburn terms 
to superficially analogous dicta in the early devolution case law. 
B   Review of Acts of the Scottish Parliament 
 If one key issue resolved by Lord Hope in Imperial Tobacco was the significance 
of the constitutional quality of the Scotland Act both for the interpretation of that 
Act and of the legislation made under its authority, a second was the approach to be 
taken to resolving boundary disputes as between reserved and devolved matters. In 
the earlier case of Martin, /RUG+RSHKDGDOUHDG\HVFKHZHGWKH¶SLWKDQGVXEVWDQFH·
approach ² common to federal constitutions such as Canada as well as to the earlier 
devolution of legislative powers to Northern Ireland under the 1920 Act, and 
according to which a view is taken as to the statute as a whole in order to determine 
if it sits within or outwith competence ² in favour of a close reading of the rules set 
RXW LQ WKH GHYROXWLRQ OHJLVODWLRQ LWVHOI $V /RUG +RSH VDLG WKHUH WKH ¶SLWh and 
VXEVWDQFH·WHVWPLJKWKDYHLQIRUPHGWKHDSSURDFKDGRSWHGLQWKHPRGHUQGHYROXWLRQ
VFKHPHVEXW ¶WKH6FRWODQG$FWSURYLGHV LWVRZQGLFWLRQDU\·DV WR WKHUXOHV WREH
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applied to the question of legislative competence.90 In Imperial Tobacco, Lord Hope 
restated this principle.91 The judicial role, he said, was not to determine where 
legislation is best made ² that choice has already been made and set out in some 
considerable detail and nuance by the UK Parliament in the Scotland Act ² but 
instead is to apply WKHUXOHVLQWKH$FW¶EHDULQJLQPLQGWKDWDSURYLVLRQPD\
have a devolved purpose and yet be outside competence as it contravenes one of the 
UXOHV·92 On one hand this principle provides clarity as to how one should identify 
WKH¶SXUSRVH·RIDSURYLVLRQLQRUGHUWRGHWHUPLQHZKHWKHUWKDWSURYLVLRQ¶UHODWHVWR·
a reserved matter and therefore falls foul of the section 29 test. First because, by 
rejecting the singular approach to the purpose of legislation that characterises the 
¶SLWK DQG VXEVWDQFH· WHVt, the Supreme Court has admitted the possibility that 
legislation may have more than one purpose ² LQZKLFKFDVH¶WKHIDFWWKDWRQHRILWV
purposes relates to a reserved matter will mean that the provision is outside 
FRPSHWHQFH·XQOHVVWKDWSXUSRVHFDQEH VKRZQWREH¶FRQVHTXHQWLDODQGWKXVRIQR
UHDO VLJQLILFDQFH· ZLWK UHJDUG WR ZKDW WKH SURYLVLRQ ¶RYHUDOO VHHNV WR DFKLHYH·93 
Second, because it clarifies factors that may be taken into account when interpreting 
what is reserved ² including the headings and sidenotes in schedule 5 as well as the 
notes which accompanied the introduction of the Scotland Bill. Third, because a 
focus on the language of the Scotland Act (which provides a mechanism for 
determining whether legislation is outwith ² and not, instead, within ² legislative 
competence) clarifies that ² ¶ZLWKLQFDUHIXOO\GHILQHGOLPLWV·² the devolution scheme 
was intended to be D¶JHQHURXVVHWWOHPHQWRIOHJLVODWLYHDXWKRULW\·94 such that the test 
is thought by the relevant legislative actors to give the benefit of the doubt to the 
purpose(s) of ASPs as set forth by the Scottish Government and therefore to 
authority of the devolved institutions.95 On the other hand, however, because the 
¶UXOHV·VHWRXWLQWKH6FRWODQG$FW² and the reservations to which those rules attach 
² are at times narrowly construed and technical it has been said that case law on the 
reserved/devolved boundary is of limited value: telling us much about the specific 
reservations upon which a challenge has been raised but leaving to another day the 
proper approach to be taken to the interpretation of the other reservations about 
which there is as yet no case law.96  
 A secondary limitation on reserved competence reflects the fact that ² whilst 
not themselves reserved - Scots private law and Scots criminal law encompass a vast 
                                                          
90 Martin, above n 15, para 15. 
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range of topics that do not easily or necessarily respect the boundaries reserved and 
devolved matters.97 For that reason, a provision of an ASP ZKLFK ¶PDNHV
modifications of Scots private law, or Scots criminal law, as it applies to reserved 
PDWWHUV· LV WR EH WUHDWHG DV UHODWLQJ WR VXFK PDWWHUV ² and therefore outwith the 
3DUOLDPHQW·VFRPSHWHQFH² ¶XQOHVVWKHSXUSRVHRIWKHSURYLVLRQLVWRPDNHWKHODZ
LQTXHVWLRQDSSO\FRQVLVWHQWO\WRUHVHUYHGPDWWHUVDQGRWKHUZLVH·98 This, however, 
is not the end of the matter: a second, and partially overlapping, limitation on 
competence (found in Schedule 4) provides that an ASP ¶FDQQRWPRGLI\RUFRQIHU
SRZHUE\VXERUGLQDWHOHJLVODWLRQWRPRGLI\WKHODZRQUHVHUYHGPDWWHUV·ZKHUHWhe 
ODWWHUIRUPXODWLRQLQFOXGHV¶DQ\HQDFWPHQWWKHVXEMHFWPDWWHURIZKLFKLVDUHVHUYHG
matter and which is comprised in an Act of Parliament or subordinate legislation 
XQGHU DQ $FW RI 3DUOLDPHQW· DQG ¶DQ\ UXOH RI ODZ ZKLFK LV QRW FRQWDLQHG LQ DQ
enactment DQGWKHVXEMHFWPDWWHURIZKLFKLVDUHVHUYHGPDWWHU·99 This limitation is 
VXEMHFWWRWZRH[FHSWLRQVWKHILUVWWKDWLW¶DSSOLHVLQUHODWLRQWRDUXOHRI6FRWVSULYDWH
ODZRU6FRWVFULPLQDOODZ«RQO\WRWKHH[WHQWWRWKDWWKHUXOHLQTXHVWLRQLVVSHFLDO
tRDUHVHUYHGPDWWHU·100 nor does it apply to modifications of the law on reserved 
PDWWHUVZKLFK¶DUHLQFLGHQWDOWRRUFRQVHTXHQWLDORQSURYLVLRQPDGH«ZKLFKGRHV
QRWUHODWHWRUHVHUYHGPDWWHUV·DQG¶GRQRWKDYHDJUHDWHUHIIHFWRQUHVHUYHGPDWWHUV
than is QHFHVVDU\WRJLYHHIIHFWWRWKHSXUSRVHRIWKHSURYLVLRQ·101 Though there is 
D¶VWURQJIDPLO\OLNHQHVV·EHWZHHQWKHWZRUHVWULFWLRQVRQFRPSHWHQFHWKH6XSUHPH
&RXUWKDVFODULILHGWKDWWKH\UHIOHFWDGLVWLQFWLRQ¶EHWZHHQDUXOHRI6FRWVFULPLQDO
law which is special to a reserved matter on the one hand and one which is general 
in its application on the other because it extends to both reserved matters and 
PDWWHUVZKLFKKDYHQRWEHHQUHVHUYHG·102  
In Martin, the court split on the question of whether the provision under 
challenge ² section 45 of the Criminal Proceedings etc (Scotland) Act 2007, which 
increased the maximum sentence which court be imposed by the Sheriff Court 
exercising summary jurisdiction ² ZDV¶VSHFLDOWRDUHVHUYHGPDWWHU·7KHPDMRULW\
(including Lord Hope) took the view that it was not, understanding that limitation 
WRUHIOHFWDGHVLUHWRSUHYHQW¶WKHIUDJPHQWDWLRQRIUXOHVRI6FRWVFULPLQDOODZZKLFK
DUHRIJHQHUDODSSOLFDWLRQLQWRVRPHSDUWVZKLFKDUHZLWKLQWKH6FRWWLVK3DUOLDPHQW·V
FRPSHWHQFH DQG VRPH SDUWV ZKLFK DUH QRW·103 Lord Rodger, in the minority, 
H[SUHVVHGWKHYLHZWKDW¶DVWDWXWRU\UXOHRIODZLV´VSHFLDOWRDUHVHUYHGPDWWHUµLILW
has been specially, specifically, enacted to apply to the reserved matter in question ² 
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as opposed to being a general rule of Scots private or criminal law which applies to, 
LQWHUDOLDD UHVHUYHGPDWWHU·104 At the heart of that disagreement, however, lay a 
deeper tension as to the appropriate extent of judicial control over the exercise of 
devolved powers. Whilst for Lord Hope the Scottish Parliament was plainly intended 
WRUHJXODWH WKH6FRWWLVK OHJDOV\VWHPDQGWKHUHIRUHD ¶JHQHURXVDSSOLFDWLRQZKLFK
IDYRXUVFRPSHWHQFH·² DQGZKLFKUHTXLUHVWKHDLGRI:HVWPLQVWHU¶WRGRQRPRUH
WKDQ GRW WKH L·V DQG FURVV WKH W·V RI WKH QHFHVVDU\ FRQVHTXHQFHV· ² is to be 
preferred,105 for Lord Rodger a narrower approach was required. According to the 
ODWWHUYLHZWKH6FRWWLVK3DUOLDPHQWLVEDUUHGIURP¶modifying any enactment which 
must be taken to reflect the conscious choice of Parliament to make special provision 
for the particular circumstances, rather than to rely on some general provision of 
ScRWWLVK SULYDWH RU FULPLQDO ODZ·106 Offering a more restrictive approach to the 
interpretation of ASPs, Lord Rodger continuHGWKDW¶>Z@KHWKHURUQRWWRPRGLI\VXFK
an enactment involves questions of policy which must be left for the UK 
JRYHUQPHQWDQG3DUOLDPHQWZKLFKDUHUHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKHPDWWHU·107 
C   Review across the Devolution Statutes 
 One further question regarding the themes of the case law is that of whether 
the Scottish jurisprudence stands alone or whether the cases discussed below form 
SDUWRIDZLGHU¶GHYROXWLRQMXULVSUXGHQFH·FRPPRQWRWKHWKUHHQDWLRQVDQGUHJLRQV
to which power has been devolved; something that is more than the mere aggregate 
of the different decisions made by the various courts regarding the relevant 
provisions of the Scotland, Wales and Northern Irish devolution legislation. The 
question arises in the first place because RIGHYROXWLRQ·Vasymmetries. Leaving aside 
the particular historical factors which made a form of consociationalism necessary 
in Northern Ireland, the Scottish and Welsh models of devolution initially differed 
in fundamental ways: the Welsh Assembly had no primary legislative power under 
the first of the Welsh devolution statutes,108 and when it acquired a legislative 
FRPSHWHQFHWKHPRGHOXVHGZDVD¶FRQIHUUHGSRZHUV·RQHZKHUHE\DOOZDVUHVHUYHG
apart from that explicitly devolved),109 LQFRQWUDVW WR WKH ¶UHVHUYHGSRZHUV·PRGHO
used in Scotland.110 Though both regimes continue to evolve (with the Wales Act 
2017 moving the Welsh Assembly to a reserved-powers model),111 the numerous 
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differences prevented the early emergence of an over-arching devolution 
jurisprudence.112 The possible emergence of such a thing has been belatedly 
facilitated by the use, in the Welsh context, of the power to make a reference to the 
Supreme Court to determine the legality of Acts of the Assembly, which has been 
employed three times since the Assembly acquired powers to make primary 
legislation.113 In its judgment, the Supreme Court drew on the approach taken in 
Martin, though Lord Neuberger noted that despite the close similarity of the words 
XVHG ¶they are found in different statutes, and one must therefore be wary of 
DVVXPLQJWKDWWKH\KDYHSUHFLVHO\WKHVDPHHIIHFW·114 Similarly, Lord Hope presented 
principles developed in the Scottish context as relevant to the question of the 
legislative competence of the Welsh Assembly.115 This willingness to read over from 
the Scottish context to the Welsh one was reaffirmed in the Agricultural Sector 
(Wales) Bill reference,116 where the Supreme Court also confirmed that a Bill which 
UHODWHV WRDFRQIHUUHGSRZHUZRXOGEHZLWKLQFRPSHWHQFHHYHQ LI ¶LQSULQFLple it 
might also be capable of being classified as relating to a subject which has not been 
GHYROYHG·117  
This read across has occurred also in the opposite direction: in Christian 
Institute the Supreme Court deliberately wove dicta from the Welsh Agricultural Wages 
reference into that from the challenge to an ASP in Imperial Tobacco in order to clarify 
WKHSURSHUDSSURDFKWREHWDNHQWRWKH¶REMHFWDQGSXUSRVH·WHVWZKHQGHWHUPLQLQJ
ZKHWKHURUQRWGHYROYHGOHJLVODWLRQ¶UHODWHVWR·DUHVHUYHGPDWWHU.118 In the Recovery of 
Medical Costs for Asbestos Diseases (Wales) Bill case,119 however, Lord Mance had 
pointed out the difficulty of this assimilation, noting that though the formulation 
¶UHODWHVWR·LVGHILQHGLGHQWLFDOO\LQWKH6FRWWLVKDQG:HOVKOHJLVODWLRQLWLV¶XVHGLQWKH
Scotland Act 1998 to define not the competence conferred to the devolved 
3DUOLDPHQW EXW WKH FRPSHWHQFH UHVHUYHG WR WKH :HVWPLQVWHU 3DUOLDPHQW·120 The 
effect of this distinction was that to give the formulation a broad or a narrow 
interpretation would have opposite effects on the scope of the competence of the 
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devolved legislatures: restricting that of the Scottish Parliament as it broadened out 
that of the Welsh Assembly, or vice versa.121 A distinct and unitary body of 
devolution jurisprudence is likely only fully to emerge in the context of a unitary 
approach to devolution such as might be engendered by the shift in Wales towards 
a reserved powers model. 
C   Review Beyond the Scotland Act 1998 
Some of the same dynamics are evident in tKHFRXUWV·WUHDWPHQWRIWKHTXHVWLRQRI
whether the grounds of review enumerated in the Scotland Act are exhaustive of those 
on which the legality of ASPs might be challenged. The argument in AXA General 
Insurance122 that ASPs might be subject to challenge on common law grounds of 
irrationality was only partially successful, the Supreme Court holding that the 
possible grounds of review were more limited both than those which apply to 
executive acts and those which the Outer House of the Court of Session had, by 
DQDORJ\ZLWK¶VXERUGLQDWHOHJLVODWLRQFDUU\LQJGLUHFWSDUOLDPHQWDU\DSSURYDO·, held to 
EHDSSURSULDWH ¶H[WUHPHVRIEDGIDLWK LPSURSHUPRWLYHRUPDQLIHVWDEVXUGLW\·123 
Instead, it was held, that the degree of common law review appropriate for ASPs is 
the irreducible minimum required to secure the rule of law, as understood in the 
(in)famous dicta of Baroness Hale, Lord Steyn and Lord Hope in Jackson v Attorney 
General.124 In AXA, Lord Hope related this common law backstop to the nature and 
composition of the Scottish Parliament, including the feature ² its unicameral nature 
² which most clearly distinguishes it from the Westminster Parliament: 
We now have in Scotland a government which enjoys a large majority in the Scottish Parliament. 
Its party dominates the only chamber in that Parliament and the committees by which bills that are 
in progress are scrutinised. It is not entirely unthinkable that a government which has that power 
may seek to use it to abolish judicial review or to diminish the role of the courts in protecting the 
interests of the individual. Whether this is likely to happen is not the point. It is enough that it 
might conceivably do so. The rule of law requires that the judges must retain the power to insist 
that legislation of that extreme kind is not law which the courts will recognise.125 
 Lord Reed identified a broader basis for common law review of ASPs, 
justified by reference to the principle of legality as applied to the Scotland Act 1998, 
by which the (Westminster) Parliament it created could only have empowered the 
(Scottish) Parliament it created to legislate contrary to certain rights and values had 
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it used express words to that effect, words which the 1998 Act does not in fact 
contain: 
Parliament did not legislate in a vacuum: it legislated for a liberal democracy founded on particular 
constitutional principles and traditions. That being so, Parliament cannot be taken to have intended 
to establish a body which was free to abrogate fundamental rights or to violate the rule of law.126 
 An implication of this distinction is that a body possessing the same 
majoritarian features as are identified by Lord Hope (features which were of course 
a function of the contingent political circumstances of the period) might ² on Lord 
5HHG·VDFFRXQW² be granted the power to act incompatibly with the rule of law by a 
statute employing suitably explicit language.127 7KHEDVLVRI/RUG+RSH·VGHFLVLRQLV
worth dwelling upon, however, for it is striking that many of the most aggressive 
public law decisions in recent decades have demonstrated a similar lack of 
confidence in the ability of the political organs of the state to obstruct the doing of 
illiberal acts or, at times, any act at all which the executive might wish to take. 
Amongst the most quietly scathing of such remarks are those of Lord Steyn in 
JacksonZKHUHWKHVXJJHVWLRQWKDW¶WKHFRXUWVPD\KDYHWRTXDOLI\DSULQFLSOH [the 
sovereignty of Parliament] HVWDEOLVKHGRQDGLIIHUHQWK\SRWKHVLVRIFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP·
was linked to the possibility that the avDLODELOLW\RIMXGLFLDOUHYLHZLVD¶FRQVWLWXWLRQDO
IXQGDPHQWDO· ZKLFK ¶HYHQ D VRYHUHLJQ 3DUOLDPHQW DFWLQJ DW WKH EHKHVW RI D
FRPSODLVDQW+RXVHRI&RPPRQVFDQQRWDEROLVK·128 Given that the electoral system 
employed at the Scottish Parliament makes majority government less likely (and 
effectively excludes the possibility of a party enjoying the sort of super-majority 
which was until recently the norm at Westminster) the fairly casual ² and not entirely 
convincing ² assimilation of the Scottish with the Westminster political apparatus 
suggests that whether or not the scepticism as to the effectiveness of political 
scrutiny is empirically justified is neither here nor there. Judicial power in respect of 
ASPs, this is to say, has been extended by the Supreme Court partly on the basis of 
a suspicion about the quality of the political elements of the (Scottish) constitutional 
order which the judgments in AXA do too little to substantiate.129  
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V   CONCLUSION 
$OWKRXJKIHDUVRI¶un gouvernement des juges·KDYHSURYHGXQIRunded, the constitutional 
limits imposed on the Scottish Parliament, and the mechanisms established by and 
in the shadow of the Scotland Act for policing those limits, are clearly a 
fundamentally important feature of the way in which the contemporary devolution 
settlement operates. Perhaps surprisingly, there has been no popular or political 
backlash against the constraints these impose on the Scottish democratic process. It 
is striking that the debates which have arisen regarding judicial power in Scotland² 
who should exercise it; what approach they should take in doing so; how far the 
common law should be allowed to augment the statutory mandate given to the 
courts ² have nevertheless not featured a basic question which has defined 
contemporary constitutional debate at the United Kingdom (and, indeed, 
international) level: whether the existence of judicial power to strike down or 
otherwise impugn legislative acts should exist at all.   
 Thus, the reaction of the Scottish Government on those occasions when its 
legislation has been invalidated by the courts has been notably restrained, despite 
occasionally undiplomatic or politically insensitive language from the courts,130 and 
despite the fact that strike down has sometimes caused further significant legal 
headaches.131 As noted above, the major controversy that has arisen has concerned 
the role of the JCPC/Supreme Court in criminal cases, but this was an incidental 
effect of the devolution arrangements, which happened to inflame much longer-
standing nationalist sensitivities (of both political and legal varieties) about the 
¶LQWUXVLRQ·RI/RQGRQ-based courts into Scottish legal affairs.   
 This relative comfort with the judicial role in Scottish political discourse is 
peUKDSVHYLGHQFHGPRVWFOHDUO\E\WKH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW·VSURSRVDOVLQDGYDQFH
of the 2014 independence referendum for an interim constitution, as well as an 
¶LQFOXVLYHDQGSDUWLFLSDWLYH·SURFHVVIRUUHSODFLQJ LWZLWKDSHUPDQHQW LQVWUXPHQW
reflecting ² said the First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon ² ¶WKHIXQGDPHQWDOFRQVWLWXWLRQDO
principle that the people, rather than politicians or state institutions, are the 
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VRYHUHLJQDXWKRULW\LQ6FRWODQG·132 That popular sovereignty was reasserted by the 
draft bill itself, ZKLFKSURYLGHG WKDW ¶>L@Q6FRWODQG WKHSHRSOHKDYH WKHVRYHUHLJQ
right to self-determination and to choose freely the form in which their State is to 
EH FRQVWLWXWHG DQGKRZ WKH\ DUH WR EH JRYHUQHG· DQG WKDW ¶>D@OO 6WDWHSRZHU DQG
authority accordingly derives from, and is subject to, the sovereign will of the people, 
and those exercising State power and authority are accountable for it to the 
SHRSOH·133 These radical assertions of popular sovereignty were set against the claim 
that the sovereign will of the people was to be expressed in a constitution which 
then limited that sovereign will.134 In the interim constitution the relevant limitations 
were the same as those applicable to the devolved Scottish Parliament: Scots law was 
to be of no effect if incompatible with either EU law or those rights under the ECHR 
specified by the interim constitution.135 These proposals, which again were not 
seriously questioned, seemed to reflect an implicit belief that a written constitution 
(and the judicial power which almost invariably accompanies it) is the natural 
condition of modern polities.136 Thus, in the context of continued membership of 
the UK rather than independence, the major criticism of the role of constitutional 
review concerns, not the existence of limits on the powers of the Scottish Parliament, 
but rather the absence of equivalent constraints on the powers of the UK Parliament, 
particularly insofar as they potentially threaten the security of Scottish autonomy.137 
 Attitudes to constitutional review in the Scottish context do therefore seem 
to be indicative of new constitutional thinking which is antithetical to the insulation 
of primary legislation from judicial control. However, the attitudes displayed by the 
courts themselves in exercising their powers of constitutional review in the devolved 
context are more ambivalent. On the one hand, there are times at which the courts 
appear to approach their task self-consciously as one of constitutional review ² a matter 
of determining, on a principled basis, the balance of control and respect that is due 
to a primary legislator empowered by a constitutional instrument; an attitude which 
PD\VSLOOEH\RQGWKHGHYROXWLRQFRQWH[WWRFRORXURUEHFRORXUHGE\WKHFRXUWV·
approach to UK Parliament legislation as well. 7KHVWULNLQJVLPLODULW\RI/RUG+RSH·V
reasoning as regards common law review of the Scottish Parliament and of the UK 
Parliament in AXA and Jackson is one example; the extension to the Scotland Act 
of the protection from implied repeal due to a constitutional statute is another. On 
the other hand, the statutory basis of the Scotland Act is sometimes seen as decisive, 
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application in a novel context of their familiar powers to supervise the legality of 
acts of subordinate bodies. On the whole, more conventional constitutional attitudes 
have been displayed in cases where the practical stakes are higher. This is not unusual 
in constitutional adjudication, particularly in recent UK experience. Nevertheless, it 
may be problematic in a political context in which the constitutional status and 
security of devolution is a highly sensitive issue. Ultimately, the willingness of the 
courts to shift to a new constitutional paradigm which can accommodate the idea of 
the Scottish Parliament as an institution with independent rather than derivative 
(albeit limited) constitutional authority, and which encompasses equivalent 
constraints on the UK Parliament may be an important factor in determining 
ZKHWKHU6FRWODQG·s constitutional future lies inside or outside of the Union. 
